Recent evidence suggests that bank regulators appear to be able to resolve insolvent large banks efficiently without either protecting uninsured deposits through invoking "too-big-tofail" or causing serious harm to other banks or financial markets. But resolving swap positions at insolvent banks, particularly a bank's out-of-the-money positions, has received less attention. The FDIC can now either repudiate these contracts and treat the in-themoney counterparties as at-risk general creditors or transfer the contracts to a solvent bank. Both options have major drawbacks. Terminating contracts abruptly may result in largefire sale losses and ignite defaults in other swap contracts. Transferring the contracts both is costly to the FDIC and protects the counterparties, who would otherwise be at-risk and monitor their banks. This paper proposes a third option that keeps the benefits of both options but eliminates the undesirable costs. It permits the contracts to be transferred, thus avoiding the potential for fire-sale losses and adverse spillover, but keeps the insolvent bank's in-the-money counterparties at-risk, thus maintaining discipline on banks by large and sophisticated creditors.
2 other, solvent banks rather than terminating the contracts. As a result, the insolvent bank's in-the-money counterparties would now have claims on the solvent banks and be protected against any losses charged other creditors of the insolvent bank. But, because such a strategy is likely to violate the requirements of least cost resolution, it may require invoking SRE. Moreover, if this occurs, an important group of large and sophisticated bank creditors are effectively removed from monitoring and disciplining banks. This paper develops a modest but realistic third option proposal for resolving these positions efficiently without requiring either abrupt terminations of the positions or protection of the bank's in-the-money counterparties. If adopted, the proposal should enhance the ability of regulators to resolve insolvent large banks efficiently.
Efficient resolution of insolvent large and complex banks involves resolving them at lowest direct cost to the FDIC and lowest indirect spillover cost to other banks or financial markets, i.e., minimize adverse externalities. Such a resolution structure should include two important features. One, it should provide sufficient time to unwind the activities of these banks, including their large portfolios of off-balance sheet futures, options, forwards and swap positions, in an orderly fashion by the date of resolution with sufficiently small, if any, fire-sale losses that would not unduly disrupt financial markets nor cause doubts about the financial health of otherwise solvent banks. Two, it should permit large, sophisticated uninsured depositors and other creditors, including uncollateralized off-balance sheet counterparties, to be put at-risk and share in any potential losses with the FDIC, so as to incentize market monitoring and discipline by these stakeholders. In recent statements, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has indicated that achieving a solution that satisfies both conditions is desirable. He has stated that: 3
II. Current FDIC Resolution Procedures
Unlike other corporations, including bank holding companies, that file for bankruptcy under the bankruptcy code and are resolved by the bankruptcy courts, banks are declared insolvent by their chartering or primary federal regulatory agency and resolved by the FDIC, which is generally appointed as receiver or conservator, under the provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. FDICIA effectively requires that, among other things, examiners / supervisors / regulators become progressively more familiar with a bank's financial condition as its capital ratio declines through a series of five prespecified capital tripwires for implementing prompt corrective action (PCA). Thus, by the time or shortly after a bank reaches the lowest capital tranche and becomes classified as "critically undercapitalized" and requires resolution, the primary regulatory agency and the FDIC should, except in the cases of major fraud or misrepresentation, be sufficiently familiar with the bank both to identify the eligible insured depositors and to estimate the market or recovery value of its assets.
2 This arrangement also allows the regulators to prepare the necessary information for speedy distribution to potential bidders for the bank or its assets.
To gain additional time to complete the resolution and reduce discontinuities in the provision of banking services, U.S. banks are generally declared legally insolvent by their chartering or primary federal regulator at the end of business on Thursdays or Fridays. All the issue is an organization that is very large is not too big to fail, it may be too big to allow to implode quickly. But certainly, none are too big to orderly liquidate…What you want to avoid is the quick reaction. And that we can do. But not to protect shareholders. And presumably, not to protect nonguaranteed deposits from loss (Greenspan, 2000, p. 14)… The potential for greater market discipline at large institutions is substantial (Greenspan, 2001, p. 7) . or some of the assets are then sold and the deposits either assumed by another bank upon payment by the FDIC or paid out on the following Monday. To the extent that the insolvent bank has remaining franchise value, all or most of the good assets are likely to be purchased and most employees retained by the bank that assumed, at least, the insured deposits. Thus, disruptions to customer-loan relationships are minimized.
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In addition, unlike in most other countries, the FDIC frequently advances payment on both insured and uninsured deposits, at this time, particularly for larger banks. The accounts are not frozen.
Insured deposits are available in full on Monday either in the form of a deposit at an assuming bank or paid out at a paying agent. At or about the same time, uninsured depositors and other creditors received receivership certificates specifying their claims on the recovery value of the assets. In cases where the bank's assets and liabilities can be valued reasonably accurately, the FDIC will frequently pay the depositors an advance dividend on the certificates of the approximate present value of the prorata share of the estimated recovery amount (Kaufman and Seelig, 2002) . 4 Thus, there is little loss of liquidity to these depositors. 5 In addition, if necessary for large complex banks the FDIC can charter a temporary bridge bank to gain additional time to unwind the bank with minimum fire-sale losses and without disrupting ongoing banking relationships. Such a bank can assume whatever proportion of uninsured deposits and other liabilities as well as assets that the FDIC wishes to transfer to it. Thereafter, all liabilities are fully protected until the bridge bank is resolved (Bovenzi, 2002) . Nevertheless, some liabilities of large banks, in particular swap and other Individual swap agreements with the same counterparty are provided special treatment as "qualified financial contracts" (QFCs) in the bank resolution code and permitted to be netted. 7 These contracts are typically incorporated in a master swap agreement and netted, so that only the net of the position with a single counterparty is at-
risk. An insolvent bank may have net swap positions that are either or both in-the-money --so that they are assets to the bank --or out-of-the-money --so that they are in-the-money to the bank's counterparties and a liability to the bank. If the net positions of the insolvent bank are in-the-money, they provide no special problem to the FDIC in resolution. Similar to other assets, the FDIC can sell the net positions to other (third party) solvent counterparties at market value. But, if the positions are out-of-the-money, the solvent counterparties have claims on the bank and the FDIC needs to consider how to treat these claims in resolution. And this may not be independent of the way the FDIC disposes of the positions.
The FDIC may currently pursue one of two options in resolving the counterparties'
in-the-money swap positions of insolvent large banks. It receives an automatic one business day stay after its appointment as receiver to make a determination of its actions. 
III. A Proposed Third Alternative
If there is serious concern about major adverse externalities both from a rapid unwinding of large bank out-of-the-money swap and other similar liability positions in a closeout and from protecting bank in-the-money swap counterparties, so that neither of the above two options appear optimal, a third resolution option --a simulated closeout --may be preferable. In this strategy, as in the full protection option, the net swap positions are not closed out at resolution, but are transferred by the FDIC to a solvent assuming party with compensation at market value. But, unlike in the full protection option, the net inthe-money counterparties are charged a fee (haircut) by the FDIC equivalent to the loss rate applied to other at-risk stakeholders of the insolvent bank of the same priority class. 12 The payment is made concurrently in a separate transaction. If the bank's assets are sold at their booked market values, this is the same loss rate as the in-the-money counterparties 11 In a SRE resolution, the FDIC can protect the bank's in-the-money swap counterparties without having to protect other, even higher priority classes of uninsured claims, such as uninsured deposits (Bovenzi, 2002) . Because the counterparties are protected against loss, it is unlikely that they will choose to terminate their contracts after the stay has ended. The computation of LCR involves assumptions about losses from firesales and may provide wiggle room for regulators to defend protecting swap counterparties when they want to. (Bennett, 2001) . 12 The solvent in-the-money counterparties can, of course, protect themselves against loss by maintaining a zero net position or overcollateralizing their positions. would suffer in a closeout and they should be no worse off. The out-of-the-money QFC portfolio is transferred at its non-credit impaired market value either to a solvent assuming bank or, if additional time is required to resolve the bank, to a newly chartered bridge bank.
The loss charged the affected in-the-money counterparties would be paid directly to the FDIC at the date of resolution in a separate payment and is effectively passed through to the assuming out-of-the money party. There is no FDIC bailout. Because the FDIC does not incur a cost and the counterparties are not protected, SRE need not be invoked.
This treatment of solvent net in-the-money insolvent bank swap counterparties is effectively comparable to the treatment of the on-balance sheet uninsured depositors at insolvent banks, except that for them the loss reduces the value of their claim rather than generating a separate payment. The same provisions for over-and under-estimates currently applied by the FDIC to advance dividend payments to uninsured depositors could be applied to the payments made by to the FDIC by the in-the-money swap counterparties.
If the loss charged was, in retrospect, too large --the FDIC underestimated the recovery value --, the FDIC reimburses the counterparties. If the loss charged was too small, the FDIC absorbs the loss. Thus, the FDIC is likely to make a conservative estimate and overcharge the counterparties until the final settlement. But closeout prices are also likely to go against the in-the-money counterparties at the termination date and, if there are disagreements, the final prices are typically settled at a later date. As there is no close-out, the entire swap portfolio is maintained intact and is either not unwound until maturity or unwound earlier in an orderly and nondisruptive fashion. Any potential adverse affects of unwinding a portfolio quickly would be removed, but market discipline by these large and assumed sophisticated counterparties is maintained. This procedure appears to be consistent with the requirement of least cost resolution that
IV. The T-Account Basics of the Three Strategies
The basic operation of the above proposal as well as the differences with those of This amounts to an 11 percent ($10/90) loss rate for both classes of deposits. The the total amount of expenditures by the Corporation…(including any…contingent liability for future payment by the Corporation)…is the least costly to the deposit insurance fund of all possible methods (FDICIA 1991, p.41) . uninsured deposits lose $5.55 and the FDIC, $4.45 to protect the insured deposits.
Shareholders receive nothing. The resulting balance sheet is shown in Figure 2 . For the sake of simplicity, the FDIC's loss is shown as a cash infusion. This is a LCR strategy. It also has the advantage that all uninsured claimants are exante at-risk and therefore incentized to monitor and discipline their banks. The strategy has the disadvantage that the abrupt closeout of the swap position could cause a fire-sale loss to the counterparties that may ignite adverse spillover effects in financial markets as other positions are forced to be closed out with potential fire-sale losses. The primary advantage of this strategy is that the swap positions are not abruptly closed out with potential adverse spillover or systemic risk effects. The primary disadvantage is that, if the bailout is anticipated, there might be a larger loss to the FDIC because large, presumed sophisticated swap creditors and possibly even uninsured depositors are not put at ex-ante risk and encouraged to monitor and discipline their banks.
Thus, this strategy is likely to increase moral hazard risk taking by banks.
3. Bank sale or liquidation and swap sales with no protection to uninsured claimants.
As in Alternative 1, the FDIC sells the bank's assets at their booked price. But, unlike in Alternative 1, the out-of-the-money swap positions are not repudiated and closed out. Rather, as in Alternative 2, they are transferred to a solvent assuming third party at the existing market price at a loss to the FDIC. However, neither the in-the-money counterparties nor the depositors are protected. The swap counterparties are charged the $10 loss which is collected in a separate payment, and the insured and uninsured deposits are charged the remaining $10 loss proportionately. This is shown in Figure 4 . The liabilities and losses are the same as in Alternative 1 (Figure 2) , but the asset side shows the $10 FDIC payment to the new solvent out-of-the-money bank swap counterparties as a decline in the insolvent bank's initial assets and cash infusions of $10 by the in-the-money counterparties and $5 by the FDIC to protect the insured deposits. The resolution is a LCR.
The advantages of this alternative are that, unlike Alternative 2, the swap counterparties and other uninsured claimants remain at ex-ante risk, but adverse spillovers from abrupt termination of the swap positions are avoided. Yet the FDIC suffers no loss.
Both the FDIC and the in-the-money counterparties are no worse off than in Alternative 1.
The primary disadvantage of this strategy may be that its introduction may require new legislation to require bank swap counterparties to enter into the master agreement with the 
